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QUESTION PRESENTED
One purpose of the individual mandate is to eliminate the market for self-insured healthcare transactions. It is well-established in this Court’s precedent
that the elimination of an interstate commercial
market is a constitutionally legitimate end for Congress to pursue under the Commerce Clause. Under
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may use
any reasonably adapted means to accomplish constitutionally legitimate ends. The individual mandate
is not only reasonably adapted but is quite elegant as
a means of eliminating the market for self-insured
healthcare transactions. The provision effectively encourages individuals to shift from the inefficient
market for self-insured care to its more efficient substitute market for fully-insured care.
The question presented is whether the minimum
coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s
powers under Article I of the Constitution.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Prescription Policy Choices is a nonprofit
educational and public policy organization providing
objective research and expertise on prescription drug
policy. Our mission is to serve as an independent
voice in educating and providing advocacy services to
stakeholders and consumers on issues relating to access to safe, effective, and affordable prescription
drugs in the U.S. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will further our goal to effectively
reduce prescription drug prices and increase access to
medications and comprehensive health care.
Professors of Law and Professors of Health
Policy are experts in the fields with particular
interest in this case. The professors supporting this
brief, with their student research assistants, include:
Paula Berg, J.D., Professor of Law, City University
of New York Law School; Alexander Capron, LL.B.,
Scott H. Bice Chair in Health Law, Policy and Ethics,
Gould School of Law, Professor of Law and Medicine,
Keck School of Medicine, University of Southern California; Alan B. Cohen, Sc.D., Professor of Health
Policy and Management, Boston University School
of Management; Marsha Garrison, J.D., Suzanne J.
& Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
1

This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole
or in part by counsel for any party. Expenses of amici have been
borne by their own resources, without support from any party.

2
School; Jesse A. Goldner, J.D., M.A., John D. Valentine Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School
of Law; Seema Mohapatra, J.D., M.P.H., Assistant
Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas
School of Law; Kevin Outterson, J.D., LL.M., Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law; Katrina Angela Pagonis, J.D., M.P.H., LL.M.,
Assistant Professor of Law, Hamline University
School of Law; Daniel G. Partan, LL.M., LL.B.,
Professor of Law Emeritus, Boston University School
of Law; Robert D. Sloane, J.D., Associate Professor
of Law, Boston University School of Law; Kyle
Thomson, M.P.H., J.D. expected 2012, Boston University School of Law; David J. Arnold, J.D. expected 2012, Boston University School of Law; Julia
Grace Mirabella, J.D. expected 2012, Boston University School of Law; Hao Wang, J.D. expected
2012, Boston University School of Law.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Eleventh Circuit and the parties failed to
identify one of Congress’s most important goals in
passing the individual mandate: eliminating the
market for self-insured healthcare transactions. The
parties have considered only Congress’s goals of correcting adverse selection and reducing cost-shifting in
the health insurance market, overlooking the additional goal of eliminating the market for self-insured
care.

3
Regardless of whether the individual mandate
is a necessary or proper means of stimulating the
market for health insurance, Congress’s goal of eliminating the self-insured market is undoubtedly a legitimate exercise of congressional power, and the
individual mandate is a reasonably adapted means
of accomplishing that goal. Congress has wellestablished authority to ban an interstate commercial
market or otherwise to prohibit interstate commerce,
as well as clear concomitant authority to accomplish
such bans by penalizing intrastate behavior. Because
the market for self-insured healthcare is a national
market, Congress may try to eliminate it.
Furthermore, Congress chose an eminently rational and minimally intrusive means of accomplishing its ban: a small financial incentive for individuals
to choose fully-insured care over self-insured care,
where fully-insured care is a sufficient substitute that
is demonstrably more efficient. The market for selfinsured care is inefficient because individuals systematically underestimate their need to save for
future medical care, due to proven tendencies to underestimate personal health risks and to undervalue
long-term healthcare costs. Insurance corrects these
inefficiencies through payment structures that encourage patients to consume preventive care and that
guarantee sufficient savings for future costs. Shifting
individuals into the fully-insured market also introduces other efficiencies that underscore the rationality of Congress’s scheme.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

4
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS A RATIONAL MEANS OF ELIMINATING THE INTERSTATE MARKET FOR SELF-INSURED
HEALTHCARE TRANSACTIONS.

Throughout this litigation, the parties and the
courts have treated the individual mandate, 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A, of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119,
as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat.
1029, as though its only goals are to combat adverse
selection in the health insurance market and to reduce cost-shifting in the healthcare market. See
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1284-85 (11th Cir.
2011). So characterized, the mandate seems to raise a
difficult question of whether Congress may require
individual purchases in order to stimulate commerce.
But a different and equally valid characterization
of the mandate presents a much easier – indeed, a
well-settled – constitutional question: whether Congress may regulate intrastate behavior not to stimulate a market but to eliminate a market.2 One of
2

Petitioners raise issues related to inefficiencies of selfinsured healthcare transactions, and they recognize that Congress may attempt to eliminate the entire self-insured market
rather than penalizing only individuals who consume uncompensated care. See Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 43-44, 50-51, Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida
(2012) (No. 11-398). We present a full constitutional and economic
defense of Congress’s elimination goal and mandate strategy.

5
Congress’s most important goals in passing the individual mandate was not to improve the market for
insurance but to eliminate the market for self-insured3
healthcare,4 shifting individuals out of that market by
requiring them to obtain insurance. Regardless of
3

We refer to the market for “self-insured” rather than “uninsured” care because “uninsured” is both under-inclusive and
over-inclusive of the problems Congress addressed. First, although it is true that most self-insured individuals are underinsured or uninsured for the care they need, even those with
sufficient savings cause inefficiencies by paying out-of-pocket.
Third-party insurance is more efficient than self-insurance for
all consumers because insurers add bulk purchasing discounts,
quality screening, and medical management. See Part II, infra.
Congress therefore reasonably sought to eliminate the whole
market for self-insured care, not just the market for uncompensated care. Second, some uninsured transactions are unproblematic but are not meaningfully “self-insured.” For example,
elective surgeries (e.g. cosmetic surgery) and extra diagnostics
(e.g. non-indicated mammography) are common healthcare purchases that insurance rarely covers. But individuals needn’t be
insured against healthcare costs that are neither medically
necessary nor time-sensitive. Elective healthcare purchases are
not “self-insured” any more than the patient’s last DVD purchase was “self-insured.” Because these kinds of elective costs
present few inefficiencies, Congress didn’t intend to eliminate
the market for uninsured elective care that is bought and paid
for. The target market, then, is for self-insured healthcare:
healthcare that is medically necessary but lacks coverage by a
third-party insurer.
4
Importantly, the market that Congress targeted is not the
market for self-insurance itself – which is not a true market
given that individuals don’t buy or sell anything to self-insure –
but rather the market for self-insured healthcare transactions.
Healthcare purchases have different characteristics when made
without third-party insurance, sufficiently so that self-insured
and fully-insured transactions constitute separate markets.

6
whether Congress’s goals of curing adverse selection
and reducing cost-shifting are proper exercises of
Congress’s powers, the additional goal of eliminating
a national market in self-insured healthcare transactions is clearly legitimate.
Furthermore, a small financial incentive for
individuals to choose fully-insured5 healthcare over
self-insured healthcare – where the two options are
near-perfect substitutes – is an eminently rational
and minimally intrusive means of accomplishing that
goal. The individual mandate is therefore a rational
means of achieving the constitutionally legitimate
end of eliminating the market for self-insured healthcare. Even if the mandate is not necessary or proper
as a means of stimulating the insurance market, its
constitutionality as a means of eliminating the selfinsured market is sufficient to sustain the provision.
We urge the Court to reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s
holding to the contrary.
A. Eliminating The Market for Self-Insured
Care Was One of Congress’s Central
Goals in Passing The Individual Mandate.
According to Congress’s legislative findings, the
purpose of the individual mandate is to regulate not
5

We use “fully-insured” as an antonym for “self-insured,” to
refer to all those who carry third-party insurance. Fully-insured
individuals, by this definition, have to pay applicable copayments
and deductibles but are “fully-insured” in the sense that they
are insured against most conceivable healthcare-related losses.

7
only “when health insurance is purchased” but also
“how and when health care is paid for.” 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(A). Although some of Congress’s findings address only adverse selection or cost-shifting,
four of the ten findings speak to an additional goal of
eliminating the market for self-insured care.
First, Congress asserted in two findings that the
individual mandate would “increase the number and
share of Americans who are insured,” 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(C), and would achieve “near-universal
coverage,” § 18091(a)(2)(D). The next finding noted
that “[t]he economy loses up to $207[ billion] a year
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of
the uninsured” and that near-universal coverage “will
significantly reduce this economic cost.” 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(E). Even without the explicit acknowledgement in § 18091(a)(2)(E) that Congress’s goal is
to eliminate self-insurance, the stated goal of nearuniversal coverage in §§ 18091(a)(2)(C)-(D) supports
the notion that Congress sought to eliminate the selfinsured market. Universality is neither necessary nor
sufficient to avoid last-minute enrollments in particular insurance pools (adverse selection), and cost
sharing depends on the health and wealth characteristics of the individuals in a given pool, not on the
absolute number of people carrying insurance or on
the percentage of the national population carrying
insurance. Indeed, merely increasing the “number
and share of Americans” participating in the insurance market accomplishes very little for the efficiency
of that market, particularly when the market is

8
structured such that individuals can move among
discrete insurance pools. The virtue of universal
coverage, then, rests in the notion that near-universal
insurance definitionally decreases – almost to the
point of elimination – the market for self-insured
6
care. As the self-insured procure insurance, the market for medically necessary care purchased without
third-party coverage will dwindle until it is virtually
nonexistent. Congress made this point explicit in
§ 18091(a)(2)(E) by highlighting the overall cost of
inefficiencies in the self-insured market and noting
that the individual mandate sought to reduce that
cost by reducing the market.
In the fourth relevant finding, Congress wrote:
“62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in
part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing
health insurance coverage, the [individual mandate]
requirement . . . will improve financial security for
families.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G). This finding
relates exclusively to the inefficiencies of the market
for self-insured care – the problem that self-insured
individuals frequently save too little to pay for the
care that they inevitably consume. Furthermore, Congress made explicit here its conclusion that shifting
individuals into the near-perfect substitute market
for fully-insured care would solve the inefficiency of
6

Fully-insured individuals are free to spend out-of-pocket
money on healthcare, but patients making that choice are not
“self-insured.” They have third-party insurance available for any
healthcare they need.

9
insufficient savings. That is, Congress found that individuals who attempt to self-insure save too little to
cover their medical expenses, and the legislature
concluded that incentivizing individuals to shift to
the market for fully-insured care would successfully
eliminate the unstable market for self-insured care.
In short, in addition to the goals that the Eleventh Circuit and the parties identify of curing inefficiencies in the insurance market, one of Congress’s
goals with the individual mandate was to eliminate
the alternative but less efficient market for selfinsured healthcare. The mandate accomplishes that
goal by creating an incentive for individuals to shift
from the self-insured market to the fully-insured
market, on the theory that rational consumers would
rather spend their money on insurance coverage than
on the equivalently costly “shared responsibility payment” that leaves them self-insured. See 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A(b).
B. Eliminating the National Market for
Self-Insured Care is a Legitimate Exercise of Congress’s Article I Power to
Regulate Interstate Commerce.
When characterized as an attempt to stimulate
the insurance market, the individual mandate raises
potentially difficult questions about the limits of Congress’s powers, including the now-infamous question
of whether Congress may require individuals to buy
broccoli in order to stimulate the vegetable market.

10
But Congress’s goal of eliminating the market in selfinsured care presents a much easier question with
virtually no “slippery slope” implications. Congress
has well-established authority to ban an interstate
commercial market – as well as clear concomitant
authority to accomplish such bans by penalizing
purely intrastate behavior.7 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (marijuana); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (low-wage workers); United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (unapproved
pharmaceuticals); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971) (extortionate credit transactions); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (excess wheat); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (low-wage
employees). Indeed, this Court has explicitly held
that Congress’s commerce authority “extends not only
to those regulations which aid, foster and protect the
commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it.”
Darby, 312 U.S. at 113.
Under this Court’s precedents, then, Congress’s
authority to eliminate markets has no constitutional
limits beyond those in the Bill of Rights (which
protects discrete markets, such as speech-related
7

Notwithstanding its holding below, the Eleventh Circuit
has explicitly acknowledged this authority. See United States v.
Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, where
Congress has attempted to regulate (or eliminate) an interstate
market, Raich grants Congress substantial leeway to regulate
purely intrastate activity (whether economic or not). . . .”) (emphasis added).
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markets). But a limitless constitutional power to
prohibit commerce has never been thought particularly troubling because there are such strong political
checks against excessive bans. Imagine, for example,
that Congress passed a purchase mandate for broccoli
in an effort to ban the markets for all other foods, attempting to channel consumption to the legislativelydictated healthiest nutrition source. Or imagine that
Congress passed a purchase mandate for Americanmade cars in an attempt to ban the markets for
foreign automobiles. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (analogizing the insurance mandate to a broccoli mandate and a GM car
mandate), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida, 648 F.3d 1235. Any admission on Congress’s part
that it sought to eliminate the markets for donuts or
BMWs would cause tremendous political backlash,
far more so than a stated goal of stimulating the
markets for broccoli and Chevrolets. Importantly, this
is not to say that political constraints are sufficient to
enforce constitutional limits nor that constitutional
limits are defined by political constraints. Cf. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000) (noting
that “the limitation of congressional authority is not
solely a matter of legislative grace”). It is rather to
say that this Court’s long tradition of finding no
constitutional limit on Congress’s power to prohibit
interstate commerce should not be worrying. Congress has clear and unbounded authority to eliminate
any interstate commercial market, at least so long as
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that market lacks substantive protection under the
Bill of Rights.
Given this clear authority, the first question for
the individual mandate ought to be whether the market for self-insured healthcare is, in fact, an interstate market over which the federal government has
jurisdiction. Because the inputs and outputs into selfinsured healthcare travel across state lines, because
Congress has a long history of regulating the market
for self-insured care, and because federalism doctrine
and theory support federal jurisdiction in this context, the answer is clearly yes.
First, the inputs and outputs of the market for
self-insured care travel interstate. Inputs, including
prescription drugs, medical devices, and medical services, are all provided through interstate commerce. A
doctor in Massachusetts may prescribe pills made in
Illinois, use a syringe manufactured in New York, or
take a continuing medical education course in Maryland. Decisions by a doctor in one state will therefore
affect the availability and prices of those inputs in
another. The outputs from the market for self-insured
care are patients. These patients also regularly travel
across state lines. Indeed, patients frequently travel
interstate for the purpose of obtaining care, but even
outside of a purely medical context, self-insured
individuals regularly travel interstate, carrying with
them some risk that they will experience a medical
emergency requiring immediate care. Furthermore,
individuals born in one state might not stay there
forever, and a patient’s long-term health status that
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arose in one state will travel to future states, impacting the future states’ healthcare infrastructures. Assuming, then, that self-insured care is less efficient
than fully-insured care – assuming Congress is right
that self-insured patients negatively impact input
prices and output qualities – those effects will not be
state-specific. Massachusetts’s success in reducing its
own market for self-insured care will not proportionally reduce the negative effects Massachusetts experiences from self-insurance because some of those
negative effects will continue to seep in from other
states’ self-insured markets. The individual mandate
thus clearly targets an interstate commercial market,
not just intrastate decisions.
Second, Congress has a long history of regulatory
involvement in the healthcare market, which includes
a long history of prohibiting commerce in medical
commodities. See, e.g., Women’s Health and Cancer
Rights Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 902, 112
Stat. 2681 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191,
101 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
42 U.S.C.); Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–97, 79
Stat. 286 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.) (establishing Medicare); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938 (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040
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(codified as amended in 21 U.S.C.). The Eleventh
Circuit’s apparent holding that Congress may not attempt to prohibit self-insured healthcare would, if
adopted by this Court, require disruption of many
deeply entrenched federal regulations.
Finally, federalism theory and doctrine support
federal rather than state authority over a ban on selfinsured care. Individual states face difficult challenges in regulating their own healthcare markets,
including legal obstacles that this Court has specifically upheld, such as preemption under ERISA, see
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), and
under the FDCA, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552
U.S. 312 (2008). Furthermore, the mobility of the
citizenry and the reality of interstate competition
create practical obstacles for state regulation. States
that have implemented insurance regulations, for example, have found that insurers flee the state rather
than adapting to regulation, making the regulations
almost entirely ineffective. Conrad F. Meier, Council
for Affordable Health Insurance, Destroying Insurance Markets: How Guaranteed Issue and Community
Rating Destroyed the Individual Health Insurance
Market in Eight States (2005). Furthermore, states
can free-ride on their neighbors’ reforms. For example, now that Massachusetts has nearly eliminated its
market for self-insured care, strengthening its own
healthcare infrastructure, residents of New Hampshire
can simply use the better Massachusetts healthcare
environment rather than banning New Hampshire’s
self-insured market. See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff
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& Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of
the ACA, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 266 (2011).
The Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that healthcare and insurance regulation have historically fallen
within the states’ police power, Florida, 648 F.3d at
1305-06, but outright bans of commodities and enterprises – even those that relate to traditional police
power regimes like health – have never been considered exclusive state realms. See generally Kevin
Outterson, Health Care, Technology and Federalism,
103 W. Va. L. Rev. 503 (2001). The elimination of any
nationwide market is necessarily a regulation of commerce among the several states, falling squarely within Congress’s enumerated authority. U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. States have no claim to that power. See
United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1962
(2010). Because the market for self-insured healthcare is an interstate commercial market, elimination
of that market is unquestionably a permissible end
under Congress’s Article I powers. The individual
mandate therefore should be upheld so long as the
provision is a rational means of accomplishing that
end.
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C. The Individual Mandate is a Rational,
Permissible, and Reasonably Adapted
Means of Eliminating the Self-Insured
Healthcare Market.
The Necessary and Proper Clause, art. I, § 8, cl.
18, grants Congress “broad power to enact laws that
are convenient, or useful or conducive” to the beneficial exercise of an enumerated power. Comstock,
supra, at 1956 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In describing the scope of this authority, Justice
Marshall famously stated: “Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 421 (1819). The Court thus looks for means-ends
rationality in conducting a Necessary and Proper
analysis. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605
(2004) (citing generally McCulloch). The “relevant
question is simply whether the means chosen are
‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate
end under the commerce power.” Gonzales, 545 U.S.
at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Darby, 312 U.S.
at 121). The question here is whether the individual
mandate is “reasonably adapted” to Congress’s goal of
eliminating the market for self-insured healthcare.
There is no doubt that it is.
The individual mandate will make the market for
self-insured care significantly less attractive, channeling consumers to the obvious substitute market for
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fully-insured care. The mandate requires all able individuals to spend a fixed amount of money each year
on supporting the healthcare infrastructure, either by
purchasing a private insurance contract or by making
an equal or lesser “shared responsibility payment”
to the national treasury. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b);
§ 5000A(c)(1) (capping the penalty at the cost of
bronze-level insurance). Given the choice between
giving money to a third-party insurer for the benefits
of coverage and giving the same money to the government for no direct benefit at all, the vast majority
of consumers will likely prefer to acquire insurance.
As more consumers make the rational choice to purchase insurance, the market for self-insured healthcare will disappear. In short, because fully-insured
healthcare is nearly a perfect substitute for selfinsured healthcare (with limited exceptions for medically necessary care that the third-party insurer does
not cover and for small copayments or deductibles
that the patient must cover), a patient who has
bought third-party insurance has definitionally left
the market for self-insured care. The individual mandate is thus an elegant means of eliminating the inefficient self-insured market.
Of course, there are other approaches that Congress could take to eliminating the self-insured
market. These approaches would be clearly constitutional, but they would be equally infringing of liberty,
equally implicative of a federal police power, see
Florida, 648 F.3d at 1309, and more problematic for
various policy reasons. Because of these unfavorable
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policy implications, the individual mandate is more
“reasonably adapted” to Congress’s goal than its alternatives.
One alternative to the individual mandate would
be to repeal the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
Enacted in 1986, EMTALA requires hospitals that
accept Medicare reimbursement and that operate
trauma centers to provide care to anyone who requires emergency medical attention, regardless of his
ability to pay. Id. Repealing EMTALA would allow
hospitals to refuse emergency care to the self-insured,
even when the self-insured truly require emergent
interventions. Individuals would then have a strong
incentive to move from the self-insured market to the
fully-insured market in order to guarantee that they
would receive treatment when needed. The problem,
of course, is that repealing EMTALA would allow
hospitals to screen for insurance before providing
emergency care, potentially delaying lifesaving
treatments even for the fully-insured. Furthermore,
insured individuals who forgot their insurance cards
or whose wallets could not be found after an accident
might be rejected for treatment. This is clearly undesirable policy.
Another possible and clearly constitutional
means of eliminating a market for self-insured care
would be to punish the consumption of such care.
That is, Congress could require the self-insured to
pay an additional fee to the government – a penalty for self-insurance – whenever they consume
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healthcare without third-party insurance. This method
of banning self-insurance, however, would be extremely impractical; individuals who can’t afford to
pay for care in the first place and who are filing for
bankruptcy because of their medical bills would not
be able to pay the penalty. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(G). The punishment would therefore be
ineffective absent a return to debtors’ prisons – which
would be far more infringing of liberty than the
individual mandate. Furthermore, a consumption
penalty would be no less implicative of liberty interests or of a federal police power than the individual
mandate. Because all individuals will one day need
healthcare, the consumption penalty would be equally
unavoidable. In the end, a punishment that triggers
upon consumption of self-insured care would be less
rational than the individual mandate, and it would be
equally anti-libertarian. See also Br. of Pet. at 43-44
(supporting the idea that Congress need not target
only those patients who consume uncompensated
care).
One final constitutional alternative to the individual mandate would be to provide mandatory public
insurance, like “Medicare For All,” which would serve
an identical function to the individual mandate by
compulsorily shifting individuals into a substitute for
self-insured healthcare. See United States National
Health Care Act, H.R. 676, 111th Cong. (2009). Medicare is constitutional, see Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act on logic
that supports the constitutionality of Medicare), and
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expanding the program would not raise any additional constitutional concerns, see Adam Liptak, Some
Common Ground for Legal Adversaries on Health
Care, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2011, at A16 (noting that
both sides of the fight over the ACA agree that Medicare For All would be constitutional). A single-payer
program, though, would be more infringing of liberty
and more implicative of a federal police power than
the individual mandate. The mandate allows Americans to choose among many insurance options, and
the ACA allows states to retain primacy over health
insurance licensure, insurance exchange design, and
enforcement of ACA regulations. Traditional Medicare, by contrast, creates a single insurance pool in
which all elderly Americans must participate and
over which states have virtually no influence. Medicare might well be better than private insurance –
which might be why one protester infamously commanded Representative Robert Inglis to “keep your
government hands off my Medicare,” see Phillip
Rucker, Sen. DeMint of S.C. is Voice of Opposition to
Health-Care Reform, Wash. Post, July 28, 2009, at A4
– but the program is certainly more centralized and
less libertarian than the individual mandate.
II.

THE MARKET FOR SELF-INSURED CARE
IS, IN FACT, LESS EFFICIENT THAN THE
MARKET FOR FULLY-INSURED CARE.

Congress’s attempt to eliminate the market for
self-insured healthcare is rational given the proven
economic inefficiencies in the market for self-insured
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care, such as optimism bias and hyperbolic discounting, which lead patients to under-consume preventive
care, over-consume catastrophic care, and under-save
for future care. The market for fully-insured care corrects these inefficiencies through carefully designed
cost-sharing structures, and insurance definitionally
guarantees that patients are saving sufficiently for
future costs. Insurance also adds its own efficiencies
to the healthcare market by negotiating volume discounts, providing quality assurances, and engaging in
medical management. Congress had these benefits
in mind when it chose to shift patients from selfinsurance to full-insurance. Of course, many voters –
and perhaps many judges and justices – might have
chosen a different approach to curing these problems,
but the standard for constitutionality is only whether
Congress had a rational basis for making the choice it
did. Given the economies of healthcare and insurance,
Congress’s decision is clearly rational.
A. The Market for Self-Insured Healthcare
Transactions is Inefficient.
Due to two proven cognitive failures, individuals
systematically underestimate their need to save for
future medical care. First, individuals underestimate
their personal risks for bad health outcomes, and
second, individuals undervalue long-term costs relative to short-term costs. As a result, patients forgo the
immediate costs associated with living a healthy
lifestyle and receiving preventive care while simultaneously saving too little to pay for future care. These
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habits lead individuals to consume inefficient medical
services such as emergent care and to over-consume
catastrophic care relative to their ability to pay.
1. Individuals underestimate their personal risks for bad health outcomes.
One of the reasons that Congress wants to eliminate self-insurance is that individuals who self-insure
systematically under-invest in healthcare savings due
to a cognitive failure known as “optimism bias.”
Optimism bias describes a patient’s proven tendency
to be unrealistic about her vulnerability to bad
health. See Neil D. Weinstein, Reducing Unrealistic
Optimism About Illness Susceptibility, 2 Health
Psychol. 11, 11-12 (1983); Neil D. Weinstein & William
M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to
Debiasing Interventions, 14 Health Psychol. 132, 132
(1995). It is an unfortunate statistical truth that not
every individual in a given group can have below
average risk for health complications. Patients,
however, systematically underestimate their relative
susceptibility to such complications, in part because
they lack complete information about population
characteristics and in part because they cognitively
overemphasize their positive risk factors while underemphasizing their negative risk factors. Weinstein,
Reducing Unrealistic Optimism, supra, at 12. Because of the inherent egocentrism involved in selfassessments of risk, a patient can lose sight of the
fact that a majority of people share her positive risk
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factors, overrating the effect those factors might have
on her health outcomes. Id. at 18.
Importantly, optimism bias is not a matter of
ignorance. Studies consistently show that even when
risk information is effectively delivered to a patient
that has greater than average risk factors for particular health problems, she does not change her behavior. See, e.g., Weinstein & Klein, supra (describing
multiple studies where education was ineffective in
reducing individuals’ tendency to overrate their
susceptibility to illness). This systematic failure to
take account of personal risk factors causes all patients to under-invest in protections against poor
health outcomes, such as by making healthy choices
and seeking preventive care. It also leads to underestimation of future health costs, leaving the patient
unprepared to pay for the full costs of the healthcare she ultimately needs. Optimism bias is a wellestablished market failure that causes significant
inefficiencies in the market for self-insured healthcare. Whether or not the individual mandate is constitutional as an attempt to combat adverse selection,
it ought to be upheld as a rational attempt to steer
individuals away from their tendency to under-invest
in healthcare savings.
2. Individuals undervalue long-term
costs relative to short-term costs.
Another cause of individual under-investment in
healthcare savings – and another market failure that
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justifies Congress’s attempt to eliminate the market
for self-insured care – is a cognitive bias known as
hyperbolic discounting. In theory, a patient should
refrain from engaging in an activity today if the longterm costs, in today’s dollars, will outweigh the
immediate benefits. In practice, however, patients
frequently undervalue the present value of their
actions because they underestimate the magnitude of
the ultimate harm, a cognitive failure known as
hyperbolic discounting.8 See, e.g., Peter Fishburn &
Ariel Rubenstein, Time Preference, 12 Int’l Econ. Rev.
39 (1982); Uri Benzion, Amnon Rapoport & Joseph
Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred From Decisions: An
Experimental Study, 35 Management Science 270
(1989).

8

While in theory a patient will discount at a constant rate
over time, in practice individual preferences are inconsistent.
See Gretchen Chapmen & Arthur Elstein, Valuing the Future:
Temporal Discounting of Health and Money, 15 Med. Decision
Making 373, 373 (1995). “[T]he relative marginal price of waiting for rewards” declines as the time necessary to wait increases. Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic
Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201, 205 (1981). To take a monetary example, while today one may prefer $100 three weeks from
now to $50 a week from now, when the time comes to receive the
$50 next week, she might reverse her preference, taking the $50
rather than waiting the marginal two weeks. Chapman &
Elstein, supra, at 374. The rate at which she values the money
has thus increased as the time horizon has decreased. Id. Since
the resulting discount factor is described by a hyperbolic rather
than constant or exponential function, the phenomenon is
known as “hyperbolic discounting.” Thaler, supra, at 374-75.
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For example, a patient might resolve to start a
new diet tomorrow, but when faced with the prospect
of actually beginning the next day, his preference will
switch for the short-term reward of eating a donut.
The farther in the future a cost or reward is, the more
likely he will be to discount the value at a lower rate.
The end result is that the patient discounts the
future benefits of maintaining a healthy lifestyle
more than he should because the benefits are hidden
while the costs are immediate. This leads the patient
to make time-inconsistent choices about whether to
maintain a healthy lifestyle, whether to receive
preventive care, and whether to save for future care.
See generally Chapman & Elstein, supra note 6. On
the other hand, when the patient gets sick, the benefits of care are immediate and the long-term costs of
healthcare inflation from over-consumption are less
apparent, leading him to consume more healthcare
than he potentially needs or can afford.
Like optimism bias, this market failure has been
proven in patient behavior in numerous settings, and
it provides a sufficient justification for Congress’s decision to steer individuals away from self-insurance.
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3. Optimism bias and hyperbolic discounting lead to over-consumption
of healthcare relative to what an
individual can afford and overconsumption of inefficient emergency care.
As a result of optimism bias and hyperbolic
discounting, an uninsured patient under-consumes
preventive care and fails to save enough to pay for
future healthcare costs. See, for example, Families
USA, Getting Less Care: The Uninsured With Chronic
Health Conditions, Families USA 2 (2001) (showing
that uninsured individuals with chronic conditions
receive less preventive care than those with insurance). These trends have a compounding effect because the patient’s under-consumption of preventive
care leads to worse catastrophic events. For example,
a patient that did not seek preventive care is unlikely
to detect emerging health conditions such as heart
failure and diabetes early enough to avoid them. The
patient will also over-consume care when faced with a
catastrophic event because she cannot see the longterm costs of these expenditures relative to the short
term cost of forgoing care. At the same time, when a
catastrophic event occurs, the patient who has saved
too little to pay for her future healthcare costs will be
unable to afford medically necessary care such as
bypass surgery and diabetic management. A recent
report from the Department of Health and Human
Services shows that the median savings for selfinsured families is only $20. Office of the Assistant
Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, Office of Health
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Policy, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Value of
Health Insurance: Few of the Uninsured Have Adequate Resources to Pay Potential Hospital Bills
(2011). Over 58 percent of hospital stays result in
bills of more than $10,000, so the median self-insured
patient will not be able to pay for the services she
receives at all. Id. Furthermore, as Congress found in
its legislative findings, these problems lead to billions
of dollars per year in uncompensated care, 42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F), and they also contribute to
more than half of all personal bankruptcies filed each
year, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G).
Another systematic inefficiency arises from these
market failures: The self-insured patient’s reliance on
emergency departments and trauma centers – two of
the least efficient settings for healthcare delivery. By
failing to receive preventive care, a patient is more
likely to suffer a catastrophic event that requires
emergent care. Failure to save for catastrophic events
drives patients to emergency rooms rather than
cheaper urgent care centers because emergency
rooms are required as a condition of Medicare participation to provide medically necessary treatment
regardless of a patient’s ability to pay. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd. The increased cost of treatment in an emergency room relative to an urgent care center adds
even more to the over-consumption effects that arise
from self-insurance, contributing significantly to the
alarming rate of inflation in the healthcare sector.
See generally Daniel Simonet, Cost Reduction Strategies for Emergency Services: Insurance Role, Practice
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Changes and Patients Accountability, 17 Health Care
Analysis 1 (2009).
Over-consumption of healthcare by a self-insured
patient may manifest in other ways as well. For
example, self-insured patients likely contribute to
greater costs in Medicare consumption and Social
Security disability payments. Wilhelmine Miller,
Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & Willard G. Manning,
Covering the Uninsured: What Is It Worth?, Health
Affairs W4-157 (Web Supp.) (2004). Because a patient
abstains from receiving preventive care, she is more
likely to need costly catastrophic care later in life,
after she has joined Medicare. While these costs are
difficult to quantify, the stress on the system is a
direct result of inefficiencies in the market for selfinsured healthcare.
In short, the many failures in the market for selfinsured care combine to create a pathologically inefficient market that Congress may rationally seek to
eliminate under its authority to regulate interstate
commerce. The Eleventh Circuit and the parties have
failed to consider Congress’s authority to eliminate an
inefficient marketplace, but that authority provides a
sufficient basis to uphold the individual mandate.
Because it is difficult to target the market for selfinsured care directly, Congress enacted the individual
mandate as a rational strategy to shift patients from
that market to a near-perfect substitute market: the
market for insured care.
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B. Insurance Cures Many of the SelfInsured Market’s Inefficiencies and Creates Additional Efficiencies, Making
it an Attractive Substitute for SelfInsurance.
Many of the inefficiencies in the self-insured
market are corrected when a patient becomes part of
an insurance pool. The health insurance market fixes
optimism bias and hyperbolic discounting problems
present in the self-insured market by creating incentives for patients to obtain preventive care and to
avoid emergency room care. Furthermore, the insurance market provides a commitment mechanism to
help patients pay for future healthcare costs and
creates additional efficiencies by leveraging market
power. Congress’s decision to channel patients from
the market for self-insured care to the market for
fully-insured care is therefore an eminently rational –
indeed, quite an elegant – approach to the project of
eliminating the market for self-insured healthcare.
Insurance fixes all of the relevant problems.
1. The insured market fixes the optimism bias problems present in the
self-insured market.
The insured market fixes optimism bias and
hyperbolic discounting problems by providing incentives for a patient to seek preventive care and by
requiring mandatory savings and risk coverage.
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One of the primary ways that health insurance
has historically corrected for the patient’s inconsistent time preferences is by making preventive care
as cheap as possible, setting low or zero copays. See,
e.g., BlueCross BlueShield of Illinois, Health Insurance Plan Comparison Guide (2011). This strategy
reduces the patient’s immediate cost of receiving
preventive care, nudging the patient towards screening that can prevent larger medical problems in the
future. For example, a patient is more likely to receive breast exams, cervical screenings, and influenza
shots when the marginal costs are relatively low.
Robert L. Kane, Paul E. Johnson, Robert J. Town &
Mary Butler, A Structured Review of the Effect of
Economic Incentives on Consumers’ Preventive Behavior, 27 Am. J. Preventive Med. 327, 327 (2004). Furthermore, when faced with the choice of a small
copayment for a primary care visit or full cost for a
specialist visit, the patient will be much more likely
to choose the cheaper primary care physician. All
of this logic underlies the ACA regulatory scheme,
motivating Congress to prohibit copayments entirely
for at least some preventive care. See ACA § 1501,
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (prohibiting cost-sharing
for preventive services that the Preventive Services
Task Force, see id. at 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-4, finds to
be successful in preventing health problems); id. at
42 U.S.C.A. § 13951(a)(1) (same for Medicare).
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The insurance market further corrects for cognitive failures by creating a payment structure that
requires mandatory saving and risk coverage. The
required monthly payments for health insurance act
as a commitment mechanism, requiring a patient to
commit money to her healthcare costs ahead of time
and ensuring that she will have enough available for
care when it becomes necessary. David Laibson,
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
Econ. 443, 443-45 (1997). As discussed at length
above, without such a structured payment plan, a
patient will not save enough for her future costs. The
insurance market, thus, provides clear corrections to
the market failures for self-insured care, making
Congress’s choice of an incentive to insure an elegant
means of eliminating the market for self-insured
transactions.
2. Insurance reduces over-use of emergency room facilities by charging
high copays if the patient is not admitted to the hospital.
Just as insurance companies create incentives for
primary and preventive care through copay design, so
too do they correct for overuse of emergency departments by imposing higher copayments for emergency
room visits that prove to be non-emergent. For example, many insurance contracts charge a $50 copay for
an emergency room visit that does not result in the
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patient’s admission to the hospital but waive the
copay if the patient is admitted. See, e.g., BlueCross
BlueShield, Blue Care Elect Preferred (PPO) Summary of Benefits: 2011-2012 Massachusetts State
Universities Student Blue Plan (2011). If the patient’s
condition was truly emergent, then she has no copay,
but if she was relying on the emergency room as a
substitute for more efficient outpatient settings (like
primary care offices or urgent care centers), she pays
a hefty penalty. These financial incentives have been
shown to reduce the number of emergency visits,
correcting the uninsured market’s inefficiency. See
generally Daniel Simonet, supra (showing a 40 percent reduction in emergency room consultations from
similar efforts).
Channeling a patient away from emergency
rooms is beneficial not only to relieve over-burdened
emergency rooms but also to allow patients to receive
more efficient care. By seeing primary care physicians instead of emergency departments, the patient
becomes part of a health management program that
provides disease management for chronic diseases
and consistent oversight moving forward. Insurance
thus provides a structured bundle of incentives to
help individuals overcome their cognitive failures and
resulting over-consumption. Congress’s preference for
the insured market is therefore quite rational.
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3. Beyond correcting for inefficiencies
experienced in the self-insured market, the insured market has additional efficiency advantages.
Although insurance provides clear corrections to
the particular failures in the self-insured market,
those discrete corrections are not the only advantages
of insurance. The insurance market adds at least
three additional efficiencies that make it even better
as a substitute for self-insured care. Unlike the selfinsured market, the insured market is able to provide
(1) negotiated volume discounts, (2) quality screening
and assurance, and (3) medical management services
such as medical necessity review.
First, the insurance market has been able to use
patient volume as a bargaining chip in commercial
market negotiations for discounts on physician payments, pharmaceutical prices, and hospital services.
By contracting with pharmaceutical companies and
health providers, insurance companies can agree to
channel patients towards certain network providers
or can threaten to exclude a provider from coverage
under the insurance plan in an effort to receive price
discounts. See Vivian Y. Wu, Managed Care’s Price
Bargaining with Hospitals, 28 J. Health Econ. 350
(2009). In other words, the insurance pool gives insurers collective bargaining power that can discipline
healthcare inflation for insured patients.
A patient seeking care in the self-insured market,
on the other hand, has no leverage to threaten or
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incentivize providers to change their pricing structure. For example, a Department of Health and Human Services Report to the President from 2000
found that cash payers paid on average 14.6 percent
more for the 200 most commonly prescribed drugs
than did patients in the insured market. Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., Report to the President:
Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending and Prices 96
(2000). The insurance market thus creates a clear
efficiency in controlling costs relative to the selfinsured market.
Second, insurers provide quality screening and
assurance that self-insured patients are incapable of
providing for themselves. Congress was clearly cognizant of this problem as the ACA includes a number of
provisions designed to increase transparency in the
healthcare market, allowing patients better access to
information. See generally ACA Title VI (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.). But
these provisions alone are insufficient to correct for
the fundamental problem a patient faces in attempting to aggregate and analyze information. Most of the
time, a patient is unequipped to draw appropriate
conclusions about the quality of the care she is receiving. She often lacks both understanding of and access
to the kinds of information necessary to make an
intelligent and appropriate decision about her care.
See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ.
Rev. 941 (1963). Health literacy, the “degree to which
people have the capacity to obtain, process, and
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understand basic health information and services
needed to make appropriate health decisions,” is a
difficult hurdle to overcome, and poor health literacy
can result in a “worse health status, and a higher
rate of hospitalization” for the patient. Ruth M.
Parker, Scott C. Ratzan & Nicole Lurie, Health Literacy: A Policy Challenge for Advancing High-Quality
Health Care, 22 Health Aff. 147, 147 (2003). Furthermore, even highly literate patients have a hard
time drawing reliable conclusions about the quality of
care they have received because causation is difficult
to establish for many medical interventions. A patient
who leaves the doctor feeling worse than she did
before the encounter might have received poor quality
care, or she might simply have been beyond help.
Even patients with the highest possible health literacy – such as doctors themselves, when treated –
often have a hard time differentiating between those
scenarios based on an individual encounter. Only
through population data can health analysts draw
somewhat reliable conclusions about the quality of
doctors and hospitals.
Of course, health insurers have ready-made
access to such data based on the experiences of their
insured. Health insurers thus provide a solution to
the health literacy barrier by leveraging their access
to collective data and their expertise in analyzing
healthcare outcomes to provide quality screening. By
comparing data on doctor quality alongside information about the risk factors of individual patients,
insurers provide a more efficient mechanism for
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assuring quality from health care providers, and they
can channel their insured patients away from lowquality providers by refusing to cover visits to lowquality doctors and hospitals. See generally Abigail R.
Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation:
Why (and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90
B.U. L. Rev. 2323 (2010).
Moreover, the same bargaining power that allows
insurers to receive discounted rates on services will
provide an incentive for physicians to keep their
quality standards high. Along with patient channeling, insurers may provide pay-for-performance incentives to physicians who demonstrate elevated
performance relative to their peers. John W. Rowe,
Pay-for-Performance and Accountability: Related
Themes in Improving Health Care, 145 Annals Internal Med. 695, 697 (2006). This is also a point that
Congress clearly had in mind; the ACA contemplates
increased use of performance measures, enabling insurers to make better use of their bargaining power
moving forward. See, e.g., ACA §§ 10326-27, 10329,
10331-32 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A.) (improving the physician quality reporting system and facilitating public reporting of physician performance results); see also Anne B. Claiborne,
Julia R. Hesse & Daniel T. Roble, Legal Impediments
to Implementing Value Based Purchasing Healthcare,
35 Am. J.L. & Med. 442 (2009) (describing the legal
barriers to implementing effective pay for performance evaluation prior to the ACA).
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Third, many private insurers (though not all)
provide medical management functions by engaging
in medical necessity review and by serving as gatekeepers for access to specialists, both of which can
create efficiencies relative to the self-insured market.
Medical necessity review creates those efficiencies by
preventing a patient from over-consuming care relative to need. As described above, a self-insured patient often over-consumes health care services, both
relative to what she can pay for and relative to what
she needs to maintain her health. Furthermore, a
patient’s physician sometimes drives costs by suggesting more care than the patient needs, in order to capture greater profits. Because of the information asymmetries between doctor and patient, patients can fall
prey to physician-induced demand that drives healthcare inflation. Private insurers are better than individual patients at reducing these over-consumption
problems for three reasons. First, insurers’ ability to
aggregate data means they are in the best position to
assess the effectiveness of treatments, leading to the
elimination of treatments that are unnecessary or
dangerous to the patient. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F.
Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637, 1667 (1992).
Second, insurers are able to provide oversight of physicians whose “financial incentives are . . . a significant determinant of treatment behavior,” using their
bargaining power and their collective data to combat
physician-induced demand. Id. at 1667. Finally, the
insurer’s relationship to the patient places the insurer in a good position to make efficient decisions
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regarding healthcare costs since insurers “operate in
a marketplace that penalizes them for failing to balance the customers’ desire for cost containment with
the desire for access to necessary medical services.”
Id. at 1665. Although medical necessity review does
not do a perfect job of combating physician-induced
demand and although insurance can have a countervailing moral hazard effect that causes patients to
demand more care than they would if paying out-ofpocket, insurers are certainly in a better position
than self-insured patients to make smart decisions
about the safety and necessity of a requested medical
intervention. Besides, Congress’s decision to shift patients from a market in which they over-consume
catastrophic and emergency care to a market in
which moral hazard might cause them to over-consume preventive and specialty care is a rational
choice, particularly given the potentiality for medical
necessity review to curb moral hazard effects. And
rationality is all that is required for constitutionality.
Gatekeepers are less popular and less common
than medical necessity review in the private insurance market (and nonexistent in traditional Medicare), but they are similarly capable of creating
efficiencies that are quite difficult for self-insured
patients to capture. By channeling patients through
primary care physicians before they see specialists,
gatekeepers allow primary care physicians to manage
patient flow, determine whether patients require nonroutine care, and avoid patient referral to a specialist
for costly and redundant tests. Simonet, supra at 7-8.
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Gatekeepers, thus, allow some patients who would
otherwise be inclined to see a specialist to have their
problem resolved first through the cheaper channel of
primary care. Overall, encouraging patients to seek
primary care instead of specialty care is demonstrably cost effective. For example, it costs less for a
primary care physician to treat a common illness
than it would for a specialist to treat the same illness,
even though the patient’s outcome will be the same.
Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi & James Macinko,
Contribution of Primary Care to Health Systems and
Health, 83 Millbank Q. 457, 473 (2005) (showing this
effect for pneumonia). Insurers can effectively channel patients to primary care instead of specialists by
carefully designing the patient’s financial obligation
for each kind of visit through cost sharing and also by
refusing to reimburse at all for a specialty visit
absent a referral from a primary care doctor. Again,
these gatekeepers are not as common among private
insurers as medical necessity review, and traditional
Medicare does not require primary care visits at all
before reimbursing for specialty care. This added
feature of insurance is merely available for patients
who freely choose cheaper insurance, like Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), on the private
market. Regardless, gatekeeping is an efficiency feature that is quite difficult for self-insured patients to
capture, and it bolsters the rationality of Congress’s
decision to shift patients into the insurance market.
In sum, the insured market not only corrects for
the inefficiencies experienced by the self-insured
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market, but also it provides additional efficiencies
that help drive down costs for patients while providing them with more effective care.
Congress’s chosen approach to eliminating the
market for self-insured healthcare transactions is not
just rational; it is quite elegant. The broader healthcare marketplace operates best when most patients
purchase care through insurance contracts, which use
cost-sharing designs and oversight mechanisms to
correct individual patients’ cognitive failures and
information asymmetries. By creating a legal incentive for patients to choose third-party insurance over
self-insurance, Congress will not only steer patients
out of the inefficient market for self-insured care but
also steer patients into the significantly more efficient market for fully-insured care. The end is legitimate; the means are rational; and the provision is
constitutional.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we urge this Court to
reverse the Eleventh Circuit and direct entry of
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judgment for the petitioners on the constitutional
validity of the minimum coverage provision.
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